U.S. President Barack Obama delivers his speech on healthcare. REUTERS/Jason Reed

U.S. President Barack Obama gave his highly-anticipated speech on health care reform to a joint session of the U.S. Congress and a national TV audience yesterday evening. For those outside of the U.S., speeches to both houses of Congress are relatively rare (except for an annual ‘state of the union’ address), and this speech marked a crucial point in the intense health care reform debate that has been raging here for the past several months. I am sure that several other bloggers have already or will shortly provide their take on the speech itself, so I will spare you my own interpretation. But Obama used the ‘best practice’ term to describe a couple of U.S. regions in which per-capita health care costs are both significantly lower than average, while quality of care and outcomes are better than average (a theme in a New Yorker article I reviewed over the summer), in his desire to improve the cost and quality of health care across the country.

It was interesting to hear Obama cite the concept of ‘best practices’ that is often used in business settings, but rarely presented to the public at large. The idea of capturing and sharing of best practices across an industry or an organization is both pervasive and elusive. I’ve yet to see or hear of an organization that claims to have a best practice for capturing and sharing best practices, and as such, I am a bit skeptical of the term in general.

My reflexive check of the Wikipedia entry on best practices yielded the following tasty morsel:

“As the term (best practices) has become more popular, some organizations have begun using the term “best practices” to refer to what are in fact merely ‘rules’, causing a linguistic drift in which a new term such as “good ideas” is needed to refer to what would previously have been called “best practices.”

Amen to that. I think that comment captures much of my skepticism. It seems to me that implicit in the idea of best practices is that an organization has evolved to a point where it is doing the same thing in more than one way, and that it can be objectively determined that one way is better than the other. Best practice sharing sounds good when discussed in an executive setting, but reconciling different approaches to an esoteric task requires the participation of the very people who are using the different approaches. While sometimes it may be obvious that one practice needs to be abandoned, it is far more likely that no clear winner will be determined.

Anyone who has ever gotten or renewed a drivers’ license at their state’s motor vehicle division (DMV) knows that the process can be slow and bureaucratic. I’ve often imagined how useful it would be for an independent organization to benchmark the efficiency, effectiveness, and consumer satisfaction of each of the 50 DMVs across the U.S. and to use the results to identify and ultimately implement best practices across all of them (some overseas readers of the Tenacious Blog may wonder why the U.S. doesn’t simply have one national process – that would be a whole other topic). But it is easy to see the flaw in my idea. Each of the 50 bureaucracies would incur a high risk of having its flaws objectively quantified and compared, while the chance of being found to have a best practice would be quite low. Even if politicians agreed to the benchmark, they’d encounter considerable resistance to actually implementing any changes to the status quo.

Such is also the case in organizations. The challenge of best practices lies not in the identification of the candidate practices, but with the choice and implementation of a particular practice. Risks are high, benefits are low, subversion of the concept is easily and often accomplished.

Or perhaps I am too cynical. Does anyone reading this want to offer a description of a best practice in best practice sharing? Please comment below.

share or save this post

The afterglow of the strategy map workshop didn’t last very long. Working closely with Linda, the next step was to recruit people in the WorldCo organization to identify prospective measures for the strategy map objectives. This process was designed to require minimal participation from leadership team members – the work was to be delegated deeper within the WorldcCo organization.

But even with this minimized commitment, we found it quite difficult to reach the eight members of Reggie’s leadership team – not only were they traveling, but they often simply didn’t respond to e-mails and phone calls. When we approached likely persons to become involved in measurement, they were unable to help without the approval of their managers (the members of the leadership team). Without any apparent cause, we had lost our momentum.

During our brief status meeting with Reggie a couple of weeks later, Linda and I (Karen cancelled at the last minute) fully understood the extent of the climate change. Reggie’s engagement was simply gone. He listened to our updates with impatience; each concern was met with a crisp “Got it, move on.” We only got about fifteen minutes of the promised hour with him. He acknowledged our concerns, and said that he would look into it and let us know about our requested actions to get the program back on track.

We never met with Reggie again.

It was later uncovered that not long after the strategy map workshop, several members of Reggie’s leadership team had met, without Reggie or Karen’s knowledge, to discuss their concerns about the strategy management and change programs. As we understood it, the expressed concern was about how much people time the program would entail, and how the leaders simply didn’t see a way to clear enough of their people’s time to do the work properly. It was never clear whether Reggie was informed of this separate meeting, but in retrospect, his loss of engagement may have been a reflection of his disappointment in his people, or in his own lack of real power to change things in WorldCo.

In retrospect, I believe that the post-workshop pushback to the program arose from the leadership team’s realization that the program would result in objective, and public measures of their performance. Rather than rallying around the change agenda, the leadership team rallied around their fear of the program, and were easily able to orchestrate the campaign of benign indifference that was ultimately fatal to the change program. The sabotage that killed WorldCo’s change program, seems all too similar to the tactics now playing out in the healthcare reform debate that is dominating the U.S. today. I shudder to think.

Postscript

With little support from Karen, Linda made a valiant effort to keep the WorldCo strategy program alive, to no avail. Although she found some opportunity to drive more successful change programs elsewhere in WorldCo’s parent enterprise, Linda soon left the company, and is now an effective independent consultant in the field of strategy execution. Karen, for all of her limited involvement in the heat of the effort, actually accepted a number of public speaking engagements in which she spoke glowingly about WorldCo, her change program, and Reggie’s leadership. But Karen, too was gone from WorldCo within two years. Reggie, of course, was promoted to a senior role in WorldCo’s parent two years later. And Reggie’s change agenda at WorldCo has not yet been accomplished.

Does WorldCo resemble your organization? Have you ever worked for a Reggie? Did you enjoy reading a five-part case study? Do you have a case you’d like to share? Please comment below.

share or save this post

It would have been so easy for the workshop to have been awful. Forty-five executives and managers instead of the promised nine, many of whom had no advance understanding of what was going on. A not very cohesive leadership team, with at least some evidence of rivalry and political intrigue among them. Some open skepticism about the process (although this was typical), and an organization whose culture seemed to be all about impatience. And in me, a somewhat rattled facilitator.

And yet, it worked. During Reggie’s warm introduction of my colleague and me, he acknowledged that he had changed the rules on us by inviting so many people. He asked everyone in attendance to give us their full attention, and hoped that they would emerge from the day as excited about the work as he was. He said all the right things, and did so in a way that was both humble and energizing, and he electrified everyone in the room. I’ve rarely seen a leader so charismatic and so engaging. And he remained engaged all the way through the day.

The introductory material that comprised the kick-off meeting was received without much discussion, and it seemed as though most understood both our approach and the Reggie’s rationale for the program (remember that it was actually Karen’s idea to begin with). Any traces of skepticism were easily addressed, with Reggie’s backing. Karen and Linda were mostly silent – it was clearly Reggie’s show. As we got into the content of the strategy map itself, I suggested that we limit participation in the discussion to only the eight members of Reggie’s direct leadership team, and there was no resistance.

When leadership team interviews result in an aggressive change agenda, I tend to foster discussion about the ability of the organization to do everything at once; this is the concept of capacity for change I’ve written about earlier. But when the draft strategy map is timid (as was the case with WorldCo), I try to challenge the organization to reach for a more ambitious agenda. I had obtained Reggie’s blessing for this approach during our preview meeting. As we went through the strategic objectives one by one, I was able to guide the leadership team to strengthen the language, and to agree to stretch the WorldCo’s objectives enough to make the strategy into a real change program, rather than the perpetuation of the status quo I had feared. Reggie and his leaders were entirely on board, and everything flowed smoothly.

At the close of the meeting, we invited Reggie to get up and present the newly hatched strategy map, which he effectively did without skipping a beat. We identified performance advocates, and I briefly recapped the next steps in the process; identifying measures, collecting data, and reporting results, and communicating strategy across the entire WorldCo employee community. Reggie’s closing remarks were a ringing endorsement of the strategy map that his team had built (with our help), and he challenged everyone in the room to make the strategy a reality.

Next: Part V: Reality and reflection

share or save this post

Each of the many dozens of strategy map workshops I have facilitated in my career has been different, but they have all been exhilarating. For up to eight hours, I (and typically a colleague) guide a group of executives to construct and agree to a concise yet richly detailed expression of the strategy for the organization (read more about the art and science of strategy map design). With only a few exceptions, executives emerged from their efforts highly satisfied with the result of their efforts, and energized about strategy execution.

Over the years, my colleagues and I have developed an understanding of the ingredients for a successful strategy map session. All members of the leadership team in attendance, and fully engaged (e-mail and telephone calls only permitted on breaks, no laptops or PDAs allowed). No more than about fifteen people in the room. A carefully developed draft strategy map that has been previewed with the leader of the organization. The pacing of the discussions that enhance and revise the draft map must be carefully managed, and it is important to “read the room” to sense when it is time to seek closure on a discussion.

The unique challenge for the particular workshop at WorldCo was the fact that we also had to accomplish what normally would have taken place during a separate kick-off meeting. An overview of the rationale for implementing the strategic management system, a brief review of the concepts of balanced scorecard itself, and an understanding of the project calendar needed to be accomplished in less than 90 minutes if we were to have the time to accomplish the strategy map workshop in the same day. Kick-off meetings sometimes become a bit of a challenge themselves when team members are not fully bought-in to the idea of a strategic management system. Overcoming grumbling and skepticism can cause kick-off meetings to run a bit long, and for that reason alone, it is better to schedule them separately. In an organization where we had already learned that time was always scarce, and that the culture accepted the reality of executives double- and triple- booking their calendars, my biggest concern was not finishing the map in the allotted time. And if needed, it would take weeks to schedule a follow-up meeting. My colleague and I were a bit edgy.

Offsetting our concerns was two key benefits. With only Reggie and his eight direct reports, Linda, my colleague, and I would only be facilitating discussion among nine executives. The challenge of facilitation increases greatly with more executives in the room, and fifteen is about as many as had been facilitated successfully. And, our draft strategy map had been properly vetted with Reggie, and nothing on it was likely to be especially controversial. So we were in pretty good shape.

When we arrived to set up at the meeting room in a nearby hotel early that morning, I was dismayed to see a much larger room than expected set with around eight round tables and six chairs at each, instead of the small “U” -shaped table arrangement we had requested. Karen sheepishly explained that she had gotten a call from Reggie the day before (while I was airborne to WorldCo’s headquarters), suggesting that each of his direct reports invite a few of their direct reports to attend the workshop also. Apparently, Reggie was so pleased with the draft strategy map that he wanted to involve as many members of his extended management team as possible in our workshop. Not wanting to push back on what seemed (at least to Reggie) like a good idea, Karen agreed. So instead of facilitating a group of nine, we were set to facilitate a group of forty or more managers, many of whom had no prior knowledge of the program. Needless to say, I was upset and concerned, but with 40-plus people already beginning to arrive and mill around the lavish breakfast buffet, there wasn’t much that could be done.

Next: Part IV: Workshop and afterglow

share or save this post

As I requested, Linda accompanied me to each of the interviews, and was able to provide valuable context and insight into what was revealed. Some members of Reggie’s leadership team were enthusiastic, and well informed about the intent of the program, but at least a couple of them had no idea what was going on, and seemed especially impatient with our use of an hour of their time for the interview. All knew of the upcoming full-day kick-off and strategy map workshop, but some were clearly skeptical. Linda wasn’t surprised. She told me that Reggie rarely met with his team as a whole, and that each of those managers was operating fairly autonomously. There were also some mild rivalries among those team members. Reggie was seen by Linda and others as having a “hands-off” leadership style.  

One prevailing theme I drew from the leadership team interviews was that Reggie’s was an organization that had a good track record of success. Few had anything but high praise for Reggie, who was seen as an effective leader with the smarts necessary to lead WorldCo. There was little recognition of a need for major change in the organization itself. But enough opportunities emerged for Linda and I to construct a credible, if somewhat un-ambitious draft strategy map. We reviewed the result with Karen, who was satisfied, and offered no revisions.

A few days later, Karen, Linda, and I met with Reggie, although our 90 minute meeting had been trimmed to an hour because of (no surprise now) a conflict on Reggie’s schedule. I learned soon after that it was typical for Reggie and his executive assistant to double- and even triple-book his calendar, and that we were fortunate to have gotten the full hour with him that we did. Reggie was focused and inquisitive as we presented the draft strategy map. This was a guy who understood things very quickly, and he was fully engaged in our discussion of the content of the map, and offered valuable suggestions. He expressed his complete satisfaction with our work, and said that he was looking forward to the strategy map workshop a few days later. We emerged smiling from our meeting with Reggie, with a renewed optimism for our effort. We were ready.

Next: Part III – Workshop day

share or save this post

Our firm was approached by Karen, the energetic and charismatic head of strategy for WorldCo, a major division of a large U.S. corporation whose name would be instantly recognizable to anyone reading this case. Her mission was to implement balanced scorecard in WorldCo as the basis for a strategic management system, and as a tool to drive an overarching strategic change program. She had proposed the idea and earned the blessing of the division head Reggie, an executive who appeared every so often in favorable interviews about leadership in business periodicals.

I visited the organization’s lavish headquarters, where I met Karen and her deputy, Linda. Karen, Linda, and I had good conversations about the intent of the program, and we agreed to the approach we would use, which was based on our standard methodology. I met Reggie, briefly, and was promised an in-depth conversation with him once we were underway. From our conversations, I developed a project plan and then the proposal itself for the work.

Six weeks later, and after several iterations of modifying the project plan with Linda and awaiting approvals from Karen and Reggie, we were finally ready to get started. The delays mostly had to do with the fact that Karen and Reggie traveled a great deal, and the difficulty in getting them to take the time to review our response to their requested changes. Their requests were couched by their contention that “things are different” at WorldCo, and mostly had to do with minimizing the time demands on Reggie and his eight direct reports. None of the requested changes were unreasonable, but the detail with which we had to develop the project plan was a bit more than most of our clients generally expected.

Linda was assigned by Karen as WorldCo’s full-time project manager for the effort, which was expected to take about six months. During that time, we would work with Reggie’s leadership team (his eight direct reports) to identify and capture WorldCo’s strategy in a balanced scorecard strategy map, develop performance measures, implement a reporting process for those measures, facilitate the first meeting to review those measures, and launch a strategy communication program inside WorldCo.

One of the requested changes in our approach was to combine the project kick-off meeting with the workshop in which we would actually develop the strategy map. The rationale for combining these meetings was around scheduling; because Reggie’s direct reports had very full travel schedules, it would take weeks to arrange for all of them to be in one place, and that window was most important for developing the strategy map.

In a standard approach, kick-off meetings are held primarily to ensure the support and participation of each member of the leadership team, and to provide all of them with an overview of the objectives and structure of balanced scorecard and the change program. I agreed to defer the kick-off meeting, but not without expressing some reservations. In response, I was assured that we would get the full day needed for the combined kick-off and strategy map meeting, and that Reggie would personally introduce and support our effort with each member of his team before we got started.

The most important step in developing a strategy map is to interview each member of the leadership team, separately, in order to develop an objective basis for a draft strategy map. I normally like to meet twice with the head of an organization; once briefly before the round of interviews to capture his or her vocabulary for change, and then afterwards in more depth to share the thrust of interview findings and test the hypotheses developed during the interviews. But unfortunately, because of a scheduling conflict, Reggie had to cancel our first meeting at the last minute.

Next: Interviews, and our meeting with Reggie

share or save this post

Saul Alinsky was born and raised in Chicago, where he became known for his organizing of meatpackers and later, civil rights groups. He is generally regarded as the originator of the term “community organizer” which was front and center in the rhetoric of last year’s U.S. presidential campaign – Alinsky’s teachings and writings influenced Barack Obama’s community organizing work in Chicago. Alinsky has always been a polarizing figure, even 37 years after his death in 1972. In the opening lines of Rules for Radicals, Alinsky wrote,

“What follows is for those who want to change the world from what it is to what they believe it should be. The Prince was written by Machiavelli for the Haves on how to hold power. Rules for Radicals is written for the Have-Nots on how to take it away.”

Alinsky wasn’t subtle, nor was he deferential. In plain language, he expressed his passion for change, and generations have learned from his wisdom.

No matter where you find yourself on the political spectrum today, the fact that you’re reading the Tenacious Blog means that you’re interested in effecting change in organizations, and much of Alinsky’s writing is as relevant today as it was during his lifetime. Organizational change doesn’t (usually) result from the kind of radical actions that Alinsky advocated, but change agents up against overwhelming resistance to change will benefit from his radical thinking.

In the course of my career, it has been my privilege to be a mentor to a number of younger management consultants. Most of them saw consulting as a simply a stepping stone to their next career opportunity, but a few of them were so engaged with the idea of management consulting as a profession that they couldn’t imagine doing anything else. It was to those few that I gave the gift of Rules for Radicals. My advice was to read the book with an open mind, and whenever appropriate, to substitute the word “consultant” for the word “organizer,” as well as some other substitutions. For example, in the chapter on Communication, Alinsky writes,

One can lack any of the qualities of an organizer (a consultant) – with one exception – and still be effective and successful. That exception is the art of communication. It does not matter what you know about anything if you cannot communicate to your people (your clients). In that event, you are not even a failure. You’re just not there.

Communication with others takes place when they understand what you’re trying to get across to them. If they don’t understand, then you are not communicating regardless of words, pictures, or anything else. People only understand things in terms of their experience, which means that you must get within their experience. Further, communication is a two-way processes. If you try to get your ideas across to others without paying attention to what they have to say to you, you can forget about the whole thing. (emphasis added)

Pretty radical stuff, right? If you’re serious about driving change in your organization, I guarantee that you’ll find wisdom, insight, and inspiration in this classic. I wish I could simply give (each of you) a copy of your own, but of course, I can’t. Eleven bucks at Amazon.com, or likely for even less (used) at your local college bookstore. Let me know what you think.

share or save this post

What distinguishes The Economist’s writing from all of the noise and posturing is both its incisiveness and its moderation. Their introductory piece is a worthwhile five-minute read that summarizes the key issues without getting bogged down in rhetoric. And their Photo-shopped picture of Barack Obama might make you smile.

The contestants are now entering the political field of battle on perhaps one of the largest change initiatives in recent history, reform of the sadly dysfunctional U.S. healthcare system, and there is no shortage of rhetoric and posturing from pretty much everyone involved, as well as the media. The debate this summer and autumn will occupy the headlines and much of the blogosphere. I am only visiting the subject occasionally here, but we are all wise to watch the proceedings for lessons to be learned. Here’s an excerpt (emphasis added):

This summer’s debate about health care may determine the success of Barack Obama’s presidency. What should he do? If he were starting from scratch, there would be a strong case (even to a newspaper as economically liberal as this one) for a system based mostly around publicly funded health care. But America is not starting from scratch, and none of the plans in Congress shows an appetite for such a European solution. America wants to keep a mostly private system—but one that brings in the uninsured and cuts costs. That will be painful, and require more audacity than Mr Obama has shown so far.

Of course, change initiatives never start from scratch, and the political management of entrenched interests is an important ingredient in successful changes programs. So grab your snacks, pull up a chair, and watch the gladiators take the field.

share or save this post

Back in 2004, Malcolm Gladwell (staff writer for the New Yorker and author of The Tipping Point, Blink, and Outliers), published an article in the New Yorker called Big and Bad – How the SUV ran over automotive safety. Gladwell is one of my favorite writers; he is able to present obscure and arcane research in a way that is interesting, understandable, and relevant, and Big and Bad is no exception. I saved the article and have occasionally referred to it in client workshops and speaking engagements, to illustrate how our gut beliefs can be far from the truth. But recent circumstances have made his article even more relevant as an illustration of the law of unintended consequences.

The article relates facts and observations that aren’t necessarily well-known or understood:

• Since SUVs are classified as trucks, they don’t have to comply with two key sets of regulations that apply to cars, fuel efficiency and safety.
• Because trucks don’t have crumple zones and unit-body construction (Gladwell describes the Ford Expedition as essentially a Ford F-150 pickup truck with an extra set of doors and seats), they are far easier and cheaper to build than cars.
• Despite an estimated manufacturing cost of only about $24,000, Ford introduced  the Expedition at $36,000, and demand was far higher than Ford anticipated. By the late 1990s, Ford’s Michigan Truck Plant had become the most profitable factory of any industry in the world.
• Focus groups revealed that consumers liked SUVs’ elevated driving position, and that buyers thought that big, heavy vehicles were safe.
• But SUVs aren’t as safe as other vehicles. Minivans, with their unit-body construction, do far better in accidents than SUVs. And with their greater weight, SUVs are far less maneuverable than smaller cars, and thus less able to avoid accidents in the first place.
• In a small car, a driver is constantly reminded of the necessity of driving safely and defensively. In an SUV, the driver is above the road and therefore less cognizant of road hazards, resulting is riskier and less defensive driving.

In short, SUVs became popular because people felt safer in them, and that popularity was very profitable for car manufacturers. But that safety was an illusion. Intrigued? Dubious? Read Gladwell’s article here.

The law of unintended consequences tells us that any purposeful action will produce unexpected outcomes and impacts, and the history of SUVs sure illustrates that. At the micro level, drivers who intended to drive safer cars wound up in cars less safe than the alternatives, and paid more for their transportation.

But there have also been profound unintended consequences at the macro level. Auto makers who sought and obtained the truck exemption to fuel economy and safety standards, got massive short-term profits and long term vulnerability (to the point of bankruptcy for GM and Chrysler) from their excess dependence on SUVs for corporate profits. The U.S. government, seeking to bolster the U.S. auto industry by providing the exemption was instead complicit in bringing that industry to the brink of collapse in the wake of higher fuel prices, economic downturn, and evaporating demand for SUVs. And the government’s intent to reduce vehicle emissions created a vehicle class that pollutes more per passenger mile than automobiles. And the resulting demand for fuel has certainly had unintended consequences on the U.S. economy and its foreign policy.

The law of unintended consequences is inescapable, but organization leaders and strategists should heed the lesson. They should carefully examine their strategic objectives to answer the question, “What else will happen as a consequence of our success with this objective?” Those leaders should frequently measure and monitor the result of change in their organizations to quickly identify and respond to those unintended consequences.

Do you have an example of the law of unintended consequences in your organization? Please share it in your comments below.

share or save this post

Gawande’s article follows his curiosity and research into regional disparities in health care spending; why some places spend far more (per Medicare enrollee, an approximation of overall spending) than others, without significant differences in overall public health or patient outcomes. His research focused on the town of McAllen, Texas, “the most expensive town in the most expensive country for health care in the world,” where annual Medicare spending per enrollee (in 2006) was around $15,000, almost twice the national average.

Any attempt to summarize the article here risks injustice to Gawande’s excellent research, analysis, and writing, but here are a few key points to know if you’re unable to read the article: 

• Demographics don’t explain regional disparities. McAllen is similar to El Paso County, Texas in terms of public health, and both health care markets have lower rates of smoking and heart disease than the national average. But El Paso’s annual per enrollee Medicare spending was $7,504, about half that in McAllen.
• The quality of treatment offered, and the quality of care received is no better(and sometimes worse) in McAllen than in other, lower cost health care markets.
• Malpractice is not a factor. Overutilization of service explains the difference in costs. Compared with patients in El Paso and nationwide, patients in McAllen got more of pretty much everything-more diagnostic testing, more hospital treatment, more surgery, and more home care.
• If national health care costs were brought down to the level of such areas as Rochester, Minnesota, or Seattle, Washington, or Durham, North Carolina (where costs are below the national average and quality measures are high), Gawande says, “Medicare’s problems (indeed, almost all the federal government’s budget problems for the next fifty years) would be solved.”
• Health-care costs ultimately arise from the accumulation of the decisions doctors make about which services and treatments to order. Some doctors think about money in terms of covering their costs, and that’s about it. Some think about money as a way to improve patient care; that money can be used to hire additional staff, employ new technologies, or offer expanded hours. And some doctors think about money as a revenue stream to be maximized. McAllen seems to be a community with a greater share of doctors with this third view. 

Aside from the highly-charged political implications of Gawande’s article (which is certain to be disputed by some stakeholders in the debate), looms a larger question: how can change be driven not just in a single organization, but across an entire sector of the economy?

As we watch the political and policy debate unfold over the next several months (some of us are old enough to remember the failed reform efforts in 1992-1993), we’ll see a macrocosm of the challenge of change in a single organization. Stakeholders will defend their interests, and agents of change will seek to overcome those resisting change. Well-meaning and self-interested parties will offer a variety of alternatives that won’t easily be reconciled. Commentators will identify “winners” and “losers” in the debate.

At 17% of its GDP, the U.S. has by far the highest costs for health care in the world, compared with 12% for the next most costly nation. High cost doesn’t buy high quality; U.S. outcomes are lower than elsewhere, with many un- and under-insured persons having little access to lower cost preventive care. Change won’t be easy or pretty, but it will be necessary. As agents of organizational change, we will have much to learn and apply from close observation of this change process. I look forward to your comments and debate in this space.

share or save this post